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Abstract
The pay-it-forward reciprocity is a type of cooperative behavior that people who have benefited from others return favors to
third parties other than the benefactors, thus pushing forward a cascade of kindness. The phenomenon of the pay-it-
forward reciprocity is ubiquitous, yet how it evolves to be part of human sociality has not been fully understood. We
develop an evolutionary dynamics model to investigate how network homophily influences the evolution of the pay-it-
forward reciprocity. Manipulating the extent to which actors carrying the same behavioral trait are linked in networks, the
computer simulation model shows that strong network homophily helps consolidate the adaptive advantage of
cooperation, yet introducing some heterophily to the formation of network helps advance cooperation’s scale further. Our
model enriches the literature of inclusive fitness theory by demonstrating the conditions under which cooperation or
reciprocity can be selected for in evolution when social interaction is not confined exclusively to relatives.
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Introduction
Reciprocity has long been recognized as an important
constituent of human sociality that functions to lubricate social
and economic exchange [1–2]. Reciprocity takes many forms
depending on the relationship between the beneficiary and the
benefactor. When a person does another a favor and receives a
benefit in return directly from the same person, it is called direct
reciprocity—in this case, reciprocal relationship is dyadic [3].
When the sender and the recipient of favors involve more than two
parties, reciprocity goes beyond a dyad and involves a group or a
network. This is referred to as indirect reciprocity [4] or
generalized exchange [5]. In this case, person A delivers a benefit
to person B and receives a benefit from a different person C.
Different theories attempt account for why indirect reciprocity can
be sustained. One line of arguments attributes C’s kindness made
to A to C’s gratitude toward a favor he received earlier from a
different third party. Indirect reciprocity operating in this manner
can be portrayed as a process whereby one helps another, who in
turn helps yet a different person, forming a pay-it-forward cascade
[6–8]. In the biological literature, this kind of indirect reciprocity is
also termed upstream reciprocity [9] or generalized reciprocity
[10–11].
Our daily life is full of examples of the pay-it-forward
reciprocity. For example, people hold the door for those coming
afterwards in public places [12]. One reason to why the norm is
held is that people walking ahead of us hold the door for us first,
and in return we reciprocate by acting the same to people
following us. In charity donation, a real story shows that family
members of a father who benefits from organ donation of a
stranger are eager to sign up as prospective organ donors, in the
hope that they can be of someone else’s help in the future [13].
Experimental studies convey a similar message that subjects are
more willing to help if they have been helped before [14]. Finally,
as a fictional yet quite illuminating example, the movie ‘‘Pay it
Forward’’ portraits how kindness as a campaign can initiate from a
naı ¨ve child to the whole community [15].
Given the ubiquity of the pay-it-forward phenomenon, an
important question to be addressed is how it evolves to be part of
human sociality. Explaining the evolution of reciprocity is
challenging as a reciprocator does not seem to fare better than
an opportunist who receive favors without reciprocating. The
difference in welfare would make opportunism more advanta-
geous, thus eliminating the survival of reciprocity. It leads us to
wonder when reciprocity would triumph over self-interest.
Investigating the circumstances under which indirect reciprocity
evolves has become a core research endeavor in evolutionary
biology [4,16–17].
In stark contrast to direct reciprocity where interaction is limited
to a dyad, the pay-it-forward reciprocity is conducted in a web of
social interactions, which typically can be represented by network.
In the network, a tie designates the flow of benefit from one node
to the other. Cooperation unfolds in networks when a cooperator
initiates providing favors to his network neighbors and the
recipients of favor reciprocate by acting similarly to their network
neighbors, pushing forward the reciprocity cascade. The problem
is that reciprocity could not continue as long as there is any
defector in the chain of the pay-it-forward process. Hence, how
cooperators and defectors are spatially distributed in networks is
critical to how far reciprocity cascading spreads.
Boyd and Richerson [18] is arguably the first study to discuss
the pay-it-forward reciprocity. Their model considers a ring
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tat in their paper) is possible to emerge only when group size is
small. Nowak and Roch [9] conceptually distinguish two forms of
indirect reciprocity and derive the mathematical condition for the
pay-it-forward behavior (called upstream reciprocity in their
paper) to evolve. A major finding of their mathematical model
shows that upstream reciprocity provides a beneficial condition for
cooperation to evolve if coupled with direct reciprocity. In [9,18],
a special ring structure is under investigation. A recent simulation
study [19] extends the model to different networks beyond a ring.
The above models were proposed with different focuses: [18] is
concerned about group size; [9] investigates the effect of coupling
two forms of reciprocity, and [19] examines the effect of network
topology. It is noteworthy that although the abovementioned
models all address network effects to different extents, none of
them is concerned with the issue of how actors of different kinds
are linked in networks. Given a network, actors can be placed on
the network in different manners, and the spatial arrangement
could render unexpected advantages or disadvantages to the
survival of reciprocity in evolutionary dynamics. A recent study
that investigates the effect of interactive assortment shows that
generalized reciprocity (or the pay-it-forward reciprocity termed
here) is possible to evolve in groups when reciprocators interact
with the like more often than random chance [10]. In this paper,
we continue a similar research endeavor to study how network
homophily—the degree to which actors are linked with the like in
networks [20]—influences the evolution of the pay-it-forward
reciprocity. Our model differs from [10] by considering a larger
strategy space and local behavioral adaptation in networks. We
derive an interesting finding that strong network homophily helps
consolidate the adaptive advantage of cooperation, but some
heterophily helps promote cooperation to a higher scale.
Results
The Model
Nowak and Roch proposed a ‘‘helping game’’ to model the pay-
it-forward problem [9] (see below). We draw on this helping game
to construct an evolutionary dynamics model comprising three
components: a population of actors, social networks, and a rule
that governs actors’ behavioral adaptation.
Population. Two behavioral traits dissect the population into
four groups: the first trait (p) governs the behavior of initiating
helping, and the second trait (q) controls behavior of reciprocity.
With p=1, actors deliver help, and do nothing with p=0. When
q=1, actors reciprocate and do nothing with q=0. Four types of
actors or four different strategies are generated accordingly:
perfect cooperators (PC) for p=1, q=1, classical cooperators (CC)
for p=1, q=0, reciprocal cooperators (RC) for p=0, q=1, and
defectors (D) for p=0, q=0.
Adaptation of Behavior. Intermittently along the course of
evolutionary dynamics, actors update their behavior in reference
to their network neighbors. They search for the actor in their
network neighborhood (including themselves) with the highest
accumulated payoff and imitate his behavioral traits. If more than
one actor possesses the highest payoff, one of them is randomly
selected for imitation. This ‘‘learning-from-the-best’’ adaptation
rule is also termed ‘imitation updating’ [21]. For robustness
testing, we also consider other adaptation rules reported in the
following section.
Social Network. Actors are placed on a network with ties
linked to a subset of the population. The structure of links
determines the potential recipients of help. When updating
behavior, actors use the same network to look for targets for
imitation. In this paper, we consider a particular network
structure—the regular square lattice—as the baseline network.
The regular square lattice with periodic boundary condition (a
torus) has been intensively studied in biology. Research on the so-
called ‘‘spatial game theory’’ has showed that lattice structure helps
preserve cooperation in clusters against the invasion of defection
[22–24]. In a regular lattice, each node has the same number of ties
(nodal degree). Even though ties are possible to be rewired,
described as follows, so that the prefect uniformity in nodal degree
cannot maintain, difference in nodal degree is kept small over the
network. This helps us to tease out the effect of heterogeneity in
nodal degree on the evolution of reciprocity as was noted in [19].
Network Homophily. We set up a torus network component
of equal size for each group defined in Table 1. As a baseline, the
four tori are isolated from one another, representing full network
homophily, where actors of the same type are linked exclusively to
one another (illustrated in Figure 1 left panel). New networks are
generated to loosen up network homophily by rewiring some of
the intra-group ties to be inter-group ties (see Figure 1 right panel).
Through tie rewiring, we change the ecology of a node’s network
neighborhood without changing network density [25–26], thereby
eliminating the effect of network density on the evolution of
reciprocity. Tie rewiring is governed by a vector of probabilities
that sums up to 1. To be more specific, consider the four groups
defined in Table 1. For each torus component specific to group
i[fPC,CC,RC,Dg, each tie of the component is checked, and
with probability pi?j, the tie that at present connects a pair of
nodes in torus component i is reconnected to a member in torus j.
It follows that with probability pi?i the tie stays intact, and
P N4
j~N1
pi?j~1, where N~fPC,CC,RC,Dg. Note that each group
has its own set of probabilities governing the direction of tie
rewiring, independent of how ties are rewired in other groups.
We index every node in each baseline torus. When a tie is
prompted to rewire, it detaches one end of the tie and reconnects
the other to a node in a different group with the same index
number as the detached node (see Figure 2 for illustration). Which
node is detached and which is reconnected is a random choice. In
so doing, we minimize the impact of tie rewiring on causing large
difference in nodal degree.
The Helping Game. We model the evolutionary dynamics of
the helping game embedded in networks. In each round, actors
first decide whether to deliver help. Actors with p=1 incur a cost c
and randomly pick one network neighbor as the beneficiary of
help worth b. Actors with q=1 reciprocate the favors, if any,
received from network neighbors. They compute how many times
they were helped in the previous round and repay the same
amount of help to a random set of network neighbors (sampling
with replacement). Initiating and reciprocating favors are
synchronous in each round so actors reciprocate favors received
in the previous round. At the end of every s round, each actor
searches for actor in his network neighborhood (including oneself)
who has the highest accumulated payoff. He inherits this most
Table 1. The Four Types of Actors in the Helping Game.
Return help received?
Yes No
Initiate providing help? Yes Perfect Cooperator Classical Cooperator
No Reciprocal Cooperator Defector
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.t001
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when no occurrence of behavioral imitation persists continuously
for y rounds or repetitive cycles are found. Once the simulation
stops, we record the share of each type of actor (or strategy) in the
population.
Evolutionary Dynamics of Two Groups
Before we discuss the results of the four groups defined in
Table 1, it is beneficial to gain some preliminary insights through
studying the evolution of two groups (strategies) pair-wisely across
the four groups. We simulate a population of two groups with
equal share (1/2). Each group adopts a unique strategy. The
probability of tie rewiring in one group is p1 and p2 in the other.
Manipulating p1 and p2 from 0 to 1, we examine the share of each
strategy at the end of the evolution.
Perfect Cooperator vs. Defector. Defectors dominate
prefect cooperators in most networks investigated. It makes sense
because defectors receive benefits without reciprocating while
perfect cooperators pay the cost of providing favors to others.
Evolutionary theory shows that cooperators can survive when they
interact assortatively with one another [27] or form clusters in
networks [22]. Our simulation result confirms the finding: as is
shown in Figure 3 (upper-left panel), perfect cooperators end up
with a share higher than one-half when they are cohesive to one
another, i.e., they do not experience too much tie rewiring and
instead keep most of their ties linked to themselves. A few
‘‘bridging’’ ties to other groups help cooperators to increase
popularity. Increasing inter-group ties is beneficial only when the
degree of network homophily is high—after some critical point,
more inter-group ties can no longer benefit the selection of
cooperators in evolution.
Perfect Cooperator vs. Classical Cooperator. The
competition between perfect cooperators and classical
cooperators is similar to that between perfect cooperator and
defectors. Like defectors, classical cooperators never reciprocate so
perfect cooperators are disadvantaged when interacting with
classical cooperators. In Figure 3 (upper right panel), perfect
cooperators dominate the population when both groups do not
experience much tie rewiring, leaving only a few inter-group ties
linked in between.
Perfect Cooperator vs. Reciprocal Cooperator. Perfect
cooperators have relatively higher popularity when interacting
with reciprocal cooperators. This is due to the fact that reciprocal
cooperators respond to prefect cooperators’ favors, and therefore
perfect cooperators are not as disadvantaged as when they face
the other two types of actors. Similarly, perfect cooperators
dominate when they are cohesive, but different from the two
cases above, it does not require that reciprocal cooperators be
cohesive as well.
Classical Cooperator vs. Reciprocal Cooperator. Figure 3
(lower right panel) shows that classical cooperators dominate
reciprocal cooperators most of the time. Because classical
cooperators initiate helping and reciprocal cooperators respond,
the two groups seem to be equally advantageous. Scrutiny of the
simulation result shows that indeed on average the two groups
perform equally well, but the variation in payoff is larger among
classical cooperators than among reciprocal cooperators. It implies
that actors with thehighestfitnesslevel aremore likely tobe classical
cooperators.Sincethe current modelusesa learning-from-the-local-
best adaptation rule, classical cooperators are more likely to be the
target for imitation. Reciprocal cooperators, on the other hand,
dominate when they are cohesive while classical cooperators are
not.
Other Relationships. Defectors completely dominate
classical cooperators as the latter benefit the former without
receiving anything in return. Unlike perfect cooperators, classical
cooperators do not return favors to one another, failing to
accumulate sufficient payoffs through reciprocation to outperform
the advantages of defectors derived from exploitation on
cooperators. No action takes place in a world comprising
defectors and reciprocal cooperators only as in this case no one
initiates helping and triggers reciprocation.
Figure 1. Networks before and after ties are rewired. Left panel: Four isolated tori, each characterized by a nodal shape. Right panel: Slight
tie-rewiring to neighboring groups generates some inter-group ties.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.g001
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We now discuss the model of four groups. Recall we introduce a
set of probabilities, amounting to 1, to govern the direction of tie
rewiring for each group (structured as a torus component) and
thereby generate new networks with different degrees of network
homophily. Our goal is to investigate what probability set results in
high share of each group in evolution. Exhausting the union of
four sets of probabilities, one for each group, is in essence
implausible. For example, suppose we divide the probability space
from 0 to 1 in 10 intervals (0, 0.1, 0.2,…,1). For each group
(strategy) i, under the constraint that
P N4
j~N1
pi?j~1, there are 275
possible probability sets. Then for four groups, the total number of
possible probability sets would be 2754~5:71|109. In light of the
challenge, we use genetic algorithm to save the computational
burden [28].
The operation of genetic algorithm can be briefly described as
follows. Let matrix P, a 4 by 4 matrix, collects the four sets of
probabilities that govern tie rewiring. Each row represents the
probability set for a group. The algorithm starts with a sample
pool of P. Without loss of generality, we consider the following
probability sets as the initial condition: {0.25, 0.25, 0.25, 0.25},
{0.5, 0.5, 0, 0}, {0, 0, 0.5, 0.5} and {0, 0.5, 0.5, 0}, which
represent, respectively, uniform, right-skewed, left-skewed, and
central-peaked distributions. Each group can be assigned one of
the four probability sets so the total number of matrix P considered
for the first generation is 4
4=256. Each matrix P in the pool
generates a network, and we run the evolutionary model of the
helping game on the network. We then check how well a network
performs with respect to the popularity of the kind of strategy
investigated. In reference to the performance record, the next
generation of P would be produced over the following steps: (1)
Randomly select two P matrices from the pool (with replacement)
with probability in proportion to their performances (2) For the
two selected matrices, denoted Pi and Pj, randomly choose two
rows from one matrix to pair up with the alternative two rows
chosen from the other matrix. A new matrix P is thus formed by
inheriting half of Pi and half of Pj (3). Allow mutation to occur to
the new matrix by randomly selecting one row and one element to
uplift it by 0.1. Choose a different element of the same row to
reduce it by 0.1. Mutation follows the constraint that that
probability of rewiring be not over 1 or below 0.
When genetic algorithm is run, average performance of the pool
of P would improve as generations accumulate. In each
generation, we target the P that performs the best with respect
to the popularity of each strategy. We run the genetic algorithm
for 100 generations, before which the share of each strategy is
found to converge to a fixed level. For each strategy, we select the
best ten matrices P and report their means and standard deviations
in Table 2. For better illustration of the data, representative
networks generated by following these rewiring principles are
shown in Figure 4.
The simulation results suggest that the population of perfect
cooperators can grow as high as roughly 70% in networks that
have the following properties: (1) perfect cooperators are cohesive
to one another, leaving only a few ties linked to reciprocal
cooperators; (2) reciprocal cooperators are cohesive, and (3)
classical cooperators are highly linked with reciprocal cooperators.
The first fact is consistent with the two-group case studied earlier:
reciprocal cooperators are perfect cooperators’ best partner as
perfect cooperators are more advantaged when facing reciprocal
cooperators than the other two types of actors. The second and the
third facts, consistent with earlier findings as well (Figure 3), ensure
that reciprocal cooperators be sustained in early stages of the
evolution. This is important as survival of reciprocal cooperators is
important to the expansion of perfect cooperators as they are a
bridging group to convert the other two types of actors into perfect
cooperators. The simulation data (not reported) shows that
reciprocal cooperators are the first group in time to be converted
to perfect cooperators, followed by classical cooperators and
defectors. The proportion of conversion of each group follows the
same order.
The share of reciprocal cooperators can be as high as 78% if (1)
they are cohesive to one another; and (2) perfect and classical
cooperators, but not defectors, are strongly attached to them. Both
classical and perfect cooperators are help initiators. Upon
receiving the benefits from the two types of actors, if most of
reciprocal cooperators’ ties are directed to themselves, they
reciprocate by doing favors to one another, which invokes further
rounds of reciprocity, and the virtuous circle provides an
advantage in adaptive fitness to reciprocal cooperators [29,10].
Classical cooperators can take a proportion as high as 93% if all
actors are highly linked to them. A similar condition applies to the
prosperity of defectors with one exception— to gain popularity, it
is required that defectors not link to one another. This makes sense
as the encounter of two defectors does not benefit the adaptive
value of each other.
Figure 2. Illustration of the rule of rewiring ties. Upper panel:
Square shaped nodes represent one group (strategy) while circle
shaped nodes represent another. All actors are indexed consecutively in
their original torus components. The figure shows the joint network
neighborhoods of actor 1 and 2; nodes and edges beyond the joint
neighborhoods are omitted. Lower panel: If the tie of square 1-square
2 is prompted to rewire to the circle group, one of the end nodes, here
node 2, is detached from the tie, and the other node, node 1, is
reconnected to circle node 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.g002
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screened by genetic algorithm over a hundred generations shows
that the prosperity of the four types of actors each requires
somewhat different conditions. For classical cooperators, the key
lies in attraction of ties from all types of actors, including
themselves. The same principle applies to reciprocal cooperators,
except that defectors must be shunned in this case. Similarly,
defectors prosper by having a dense network with all other types of
actors, but not themselves. In contrast, perfect cooperators need to
be isolated in structure, and their expansion is channeled through
a few bridging ties with reciprocal cooperators. Group cohesive-
ness, i.e., ties with same group members, is required for prosperity
of each type of actor except for defectors. Only classical
cooperators can prosper with a dense network with defectors.
Finally, it is noteworthy that prosperity of one type of actor is
determined in part by how other types of actors are structured—
manifesting the property of interdependency in complex systems.
Notes on Robustness of the Results and Limitations of
the Model
The simulation results reported in Table 2 attempt to illustrate
the general conditions beneficial to the popularity of each type of
strategy. Using genetic algorithm, we attempt to locate the
probability sets, wrapped up in matrix P, that would maximize the
share of each strategy in the population. As a typical optimization
problem, we cannot be sure that the optimal matrix P is unique,
nor is there any perfect algorithm that guarantees all the optimal
solutions be located. In light of these facts, one should treat the
numeric information reported in Table 2 as a general trend rather
than a unique optimal condition. Nevertheless, the consistency in
results between the four-group and the two-group cases, wherein
full probability space is considered, confirms the merit of using
genetic algorithm for search of optimal solutions.
The simulation results presented here are built on a set of
parameters whose values are subject to modifications. We run
more simulations reported below to see how the results change
when some of the modeling assumptions are relaxed, parameter
values are adjusted, or alternative solutions are considered.
Regarding b (benefit of help) and c (cost of helping). It is
well established in mathematical/evolutionary biology that the
benefit-cost ratio (b/c) of helping is critical to the selection of
cooperation. A simple rule, derived originally from Hamilton [30],
predicts that cooperators are more likely to survive if the benefit-
cost ratio is large, other conditions being equal. We manipulate the
magnitude of b, leaving other conditions fixed in the simulation
model, to test how the benefit-cost ratio influences the results. For
Figure 3. The evolutionary advantages of different kinds of actors. Upper left panel: The evolutionary advantages of perfect cooperators
over defectors. The contour plot quantifies the average share of perfect cooperators over 100 cases. Share below 0.5 is in white color, representing
inferiority when competing with defectors. The two axes mark rewiring probabilities with an increment of 0.025. Upper right panel: The
evolutionary advantages of perfect cooperators over classical cooperators. Share below 0.5 is in white color, representing inferiority when
competing with classical cooperators. Lower left panel: The evolutionary advantages of perfect cooperators over reciprocal cooperators. Share
below 0.5 is in white color, representing inferiority when competing with reciprocal cooperators. Lower right panel: The evolutionary advantages
of reciprocal cooperators over classical cooperators. Share below 0.5 is in white color, representing inferiority when competing with classical
cooperators.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.g003
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optimal network-tie-rewiring probability matrix (Table 2) as the
network generation principle. We then replicate five-hundred
random cases of the pay-it-forward game dynamics. The online
supporting material (Figure S1, Figure S2, Figure S3 and Figure
S4) reports the average share of each strategy over different values
of b. Clearly, increasing b leads to higher proportions of perfect
and reciprocal cooperators in the population. The effect, however,
is not as pronounced on the growth of defectors and classical
cooperators.
Regarding network density. In the current model, we
consider a regular square lattice network with the Neumann
neighborhood (a torus) as the default network (before tie rewiring
takes place). In the Neumann neighborhood, each actor has four
network neighbors. When a torus is projected on a (two-
dimensional) plane, each actor is neighboring others who have
one-unit of distance moving on the two coordinates. We can
increase network density by allowing actors to link to others
further away on the plane. Widening the neighborhood radius
from one (Neumann neighborhood) to four increases the number
of neighbors per actor from 4 to 24 (full network in the current
model setting with N=100). We run more simulations, changing
network density in this manner, to see how network density
influences the results. The online supporting material (Figure S1,
Figure S2, Figure S3 and Figure S4) shows that increasing network
density does not impede, but instead benefits the selection of
perfect and reciprocal cooperators. The finding is opposite to the
general rule discussed in network-reciprocity modeling [4]:
cooperation thrives if b/c.k, where k represents average number
of network neighbors per actor. The discrepancy in the effect of
network density is due to the difference in modeling assumption: in
modeling cooperation game on graphs (or network reciprocity
defined in [4]), an actor interacts with each of his network
neighbors, while in the pay-it-forward game studied in earlier work
[9,19] and here, a helper randomly picks one network neighbor as
the recipient of help. It is easy to see that increasing network
density inflicts heavier burden on cooperators in the former case as
a cooperator needs incur the cost of helping for each neighbor.
While costly in the network reciprocity game, higher network
density renders more opportunities to receive favors from others in
the pay-it-forward game studied here. Reciprocating these favors,
albeit costly, form a virtuous circle by reinforcing the evolutionary
advantages of cooperators when they are structured cohesively in
networks. It explains why there is a difference in the effect of
network density between the two models of the evolution of
cooperation.
Regarding the adaptation rule. Throughout the paper thus
far, we use a deterministic learning-from-the-local-best adaptation
rule. Its empirical validity recently has received some support from
behavioral experiments [31].Certainly this is not the only
adaptation rule available for consideration. To see whether
adaptation rules make a difference in results, we run more
simulations, each of which adopts a unique adaptation process
currently studied in the literature, leaving other conditions same as
specified in the method section. We refer to a recent study [32]
that summarizes a great variety of combinations of adaptation
rules and update dynamics. Three adaptation rules considered
here are: Best Imitation—a deterministic adaptation rule that
imitates the strategy of the most successful neighbor in fitness (the
default model of the paper); Fermi function—a stochastic
adaptation rule that transforms exponentially the difference in
fitness to the probability of strategy imitation, and Linear
Probability Payoff Difference—a stochastic adaptation rule that
transforms linearly the difference in fitness to the probability of
strategy imitation. Moreover, two update dynamics are
investigated: synchronous updating—in each round, all actors
first play the pay-it-forward game, followed by strategy adaptation,
and asynchronous updating—actors take turns playing the game
and updating strategies. The online supporting material (Table S1,
Table S2, Table S3 and Table S4) shows how each strategy
Table 2. Means and standard deviations (in parentheses) of the ten optimal matrices P for each type of actor.
Matrices P that achieve the maximum share of:
D
(average share=0.99)
RC
(average share=0.78)
CC
(average share=0.93)
PC
(average share=0.70)
PDRD 0.06 (0.08) 0.69 (0.08) 0.11 (0.06) 0.25 (0.10)
PDRRC 0.37 (0.10) 0.14 (0.07) 0.11 (0.08) 0.51 (0.19)
PDRCC 0.31 (0.10) 0.10 (0.05) 0.74 (0.06) 0.24 (0.16)
PDRPC 0.26 (0.13) 0.07 (0.04) 0.04 (0.02) 0 (0)
PRCRD 0.68 (0.11) 0.02 (0.04) 0.01 (0.03) 0.06 (0.07)
PRCRRC 0.30 (0.11) 0.73 (0.08) 0.11 (0.06) 0.83 (0.08)
PRCRCC 0 (0) 0.10 (0.05) 0.84 (0.07) 0.11 (0.11)
PRCRPC 0.02 (0.04) 0.15 (0.11) 0.04 (0.05) 0 (0)
PCCRD 0.66 (0.11) 0.18 (0.04) 0.04 (0.05) 0.09 (0.06)
PCCRRC 0.11 (0.14) 0.76 (0.07) 0.12 (0.09) 0.70 (0.08)
PCCRCC 0.10 (0.07) 0.06 (0.07) 0.68 (0.06) 0.21 (0.07)
PCCRPC 0.13 (0.10) 0 (0) 0.16 (0.07) 0 (0)
PPCRD 0.62 (0.19) 0.00 (0) 0.00 (0) 0 (0)
PPCRRC 0.07 (0.05) 0.83 (0.08) 0.08 (0.09) 0.10 (0)
PPCRCC 0.06 (0.06) 0.00 (0) 0.74 (0.11) 0 (0)
PPCRPC 0.25 (0.21) 0.17 (0.08) 0.18 (0.06) 0.90 (0)
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.t002
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dynamics. The tables report average share of each strategy in
networks generated by following their optimal tie-rewiring
probability sets respectively reported in Table 2. In general,
asynchronous updating is more beneficial than synchronous
updating to the increase of each strategy. Among the adaptation
rules considered here, Fermi function works the best, followed by
best imitation and linear probability function. Thus, the result
presented earlier in the paper, considering a deterministic best
imitation rule, represents a modest estimation of the evolutionary
result.
There could be a difference, however, between learning-from-
the-local-best and learning-from-the-global-best adaptation rule.
Actors under the former rule learn from the most successful one in
their local network neighborhoods, while under the latter rule,
they target the most successful one in the whole population.
Learning from the local best is a less radical selection rule in
evolutionary dynamics, and it helps preserve cooperation in
locality. As we can imagine, if actors possess local vision only, a
cluster of cooperators would learn from each other and remain
cooperators despite the fact that a few defectors on the skirt of the
cluster might fare better by exploiting cooperators positioned on
the periphery of the cluster. However, under certain circumstances
local adaptation is not beneficial to the selection of cooperation. It
has been shown that when adaptation is made locally, altruism not
only benefits a rival’s fitness, but also increases his evolutionary
advantages in taking over the neighborhoods which they both
compete for [33–35]. To modify Hamilton’s rule to this case, we
Figure 4. Graphic illustration of the optimal networks. Upper left panel: A representative network generated by following the optimal
rewiring strategy selected by genetic algorithm to maximize the popularity of prefect cooperators. Clockwise from the tiptop of the layout: the first
quadrant are nodes of defectors, followed by the second quadrant of reciprocal cooperators, the third quadrant of classical cooperators and finally
the fourth quadrant of perfect cooperators. Upper right panel: A representative network generated by following the optimal rewiring strategy
selected by genetic algorithm to maximize the popularity of reciprocal cooperators. The layout of nodes is same as above. Lower left panel: A
representative network generated by following the optimal rewiring strategy selected by genetic algorithm to maximize the popularity of classical
cooperators. The layout of nodes is same as above. Lower right panel: A representative network generated by following the optimal rewiring
strategy selected by genetic algorithm to maximize the popularity of defectors. The layout of nodes is same as above.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0029188.g004
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increasing the competiveness of neighboring rivals [35]. Without
loss of generality, the current paper assumes that actors have local
vision both in playing the cooperation game and behavioral
adaptation. It is rather rare to see actors have a local vision in one
thing, yet a global one in the other.
Other issues. Varying population size is not expected to
change the results as long as the share of each strategy stays fixed
in the initial condition. Note that in the current model we start
with four isolated tori—one for each strategy—before ties are
rewired. Each strategy, instead of clustering in one torus, could
begin with a bunch of tori of smaller sizes. For this inquiry, we run
three separate simulations with the same N=576. In one
simulation, each strategy starts structured in 16 tori of size 9; in
another simulation, each strategy is in 4 tori of size 36, and in the
last simulation, each strategy is in 1 torus of size 144. We run 500
cases for each condition. The results show a weak effect of group
size: the share of a strategy increases slightly when it starts with a
smaller number of tori of larger sizes. For example, for perfect
cooperators, the share is 0.59 in the first condition, 0.66 in the
second and 0.68 in the third.
Other technical details that control the simulation process, such
as the interval of behavioral updating (s) and the continuum of no
imitation occurring (y) used to stop the simulation, do not make
differences to the results.
Discussion
Anecdotes about daily-life activities and research findings from
laboratory experiments have confirmed the universality of the
pay-it-forward reciprocity in human nature. What is less clear is
how this kind of prosocial behavior comes into being given its
inferiority in adaptive value than self-interested acts. More than
two decades ago, Boyd and Richerson [18] drew a pessimistic
conclusion based on their evolutionary model that the pay-it-
forward reciprocity is not possible to emerge except in small
groups. Yet, a recent study [10] shows that generalized
reciprocity is possible to emerge so long as assortative interaction
is implemented. In this article, we argue that the pay-it-forward
reciprocity could prevail in large populations structured by
networks under certain spatial arrangements. Following the
framework of [9], we develop an evolutionary model and
examine how network homophily influences the evolution of the
pay-it-forward reciprocity. The simulation results carry two main
messages: first, actors who inherit the behavioral trait of
reciprocity need to be cohesive to one another in order to resist
the invasion of defectors or non-reciprocal cooperators. Howev-
er, contacts with non-reciprocator groups, albeit slightly, is
important to further increasing the popularity of reciprocity. The
first principle helps consolidate the adaptive advantage of
cooperators, while the second principle helps market cooperation
to defectors or non-reciprocators. These two principles taken
together imply that moderate heterogeneity in the demographic
composition of network neighborhood is beneficial to the
emergence of cooperation. This insight is consistent with
modeling work on cooperation along a ring structure [36],
collective action dynamics [37], the evolution of social norms
[38], and empirical finding of the spread of contraceptive use in
social networks [39].
The first principle that cohesion is necessary for reciprocators
to be adaptive is in line with the previous research on inclusive
fitness that stems from the original work on kin selection [31].
According to the theory of kin selection, altruistic behavior is
adaptive when rb-c.0, where c is the cost, b is the benefit, and r is
the relatedness of the two actors. This simple inequality means
that higher levels of cooperation are attained when r or b is higher
while c is lower. This simple rule has been shown to explain
altruistic behavior in a wide range of social conditions [40]. Two
possible mechanisms through which a high r could arise between
individuals are kin discrimination and limited dispersal [41]. Kin
discrimination means that an individual can distinguish between
relatives and non-relatives and preferentially direct cooperation
towards relatives. Limited dispersal means that offspring are born
and live around parents [30]. As an unintended consequence,
relatedness becomes higher among interacting individuals. It
means that even if individuals engage in altruistic behavior
indiscriminately, their targets are likely to be their relatives. Our
model echoes the limited dispersal argument of inclusive fitness
theory although the inclusive fitness costs and benefits of
cooperation in viscous population can cancel out, unless the
scales of interaction and selection are different [33–35]. This is
because the more likely cooperators interact with one another,
despite higher benefits being achieved, the less likely defectors
outside the clusters of cooperators can be reached and adapted to
cooperation. Our model shows that adequate interaction with a
different kind of actors does not impede, but instead benefits the
increase of cooperation. It is not only because contacts with
heterogeneous others help propagate the adaptive advantages of
cooperation to non-cooperators, but also because the evolution-
ary advantages of cooperation stem in part from cohesive
interactions across two different, yet mutually beneficial types of
actors, such as perfect cooperators and reciprocal cooperators in
the pay-it-forward game. Our model thus enriches inclusive
fitness theory by demonstrating some conditions under which
interaction with non-relatives can be beneficial for cooperators to
be adaptive.
Network homophily—the tendency of agents to form social
relationships with those with similar attributes or backgrounds—is
a universal phenomenon in various domains, ranging from the
formation of friendship in high schools [42] to partner choice in
marriage [43]. It is unclear why humans possess a strong
propensity to associate with the like, but in the study on group
cooperation and coordination, research shows that homophily
helps reduce communication cost and signify group identity,
thereby facilitating cooperation within groups [44]. The benefit of
increasing group welfare can explain in part why homophily
becomes a strong psychological principle guiding the formation of
social relationships. However, cooperation induced by group
homophily is limited to same-group members. Larger-scale
cooperation, such as combating global warming, would inevitably
require alliances that go beyond local group boundaries. As is
pointed out in this article, the ingredient of moderate heteroge-
neity added to a homophilous environment sometimes does not
hamper, but instead benefits the propagation of cooperation,
although how heterogeneous is seen as optimal depends on the
social context in question.
The current study hopes to stimulate more empirical research
on the network foundation for the emergence of the pay-it-forward
reciprocity. As is emphasized in this article, not only is the
typology of networks, but also the spatial distribution of
heterogeneous actors is critical to how far the conduct of
reciprocity spreads. To empirically test the idea, one can, for
example, categorize subjects based on their prosociality propensity
[45] and then manipulate the spatial distribution of these subjects
in network settings conducted either in the laboratory or in the
field. Feedback from the empirical research and new models
modified according to it will enhance our understanding of how
human morality emerges.
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List of Parameter Values (for the simulation results
reported in the context)
Population size (N)=100
Benefit of help (b)=5
Cost of helping (c)=3
Simulation is stopped if no imitation occurs for (y)=200 rounds
Behaviors are consider for adaptation for every (s)=5 rounds
Number of replications for each rewiring probability set: 50
The pseudo-code of the simulation model can be found in the
online supporting material (File S1).
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